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FIRST MONDAY - THE DARK SIDE OF
FEDERALISM IN THE NINETIES: RESTRICTING
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES*
Rosalie Berger Levinson-
The most dominant theme of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence is
federalism. Although this term refers to maintaining a proper balance
between state and federal power, to the Rehnquist Court it has meant
restoring power to the states. It has invoked federalism to limit
congressional power to enact laws on behalf of the people, even when
such laws expand individual liberty. Further, it has invoked federalism
as a basis for denying a broad interpretation of constitutional guarantees.
This essay will explore generally the growth of federalism as an obstacle
to enforcing federal rights and then more specifically the Court's use of
federalism to deny the rights of religious minorities.
I. THE EXPANDED USE OF FEDERALISM BY THE REHNQUIST COURT
The Framers of the Constitution struggled with the question of how
best to distribute power between the states and the federal government.
The Constitution which emerged mandates that Congress may enact
legislation only pursuant to powers specifically enumerated in that
document. Among those powers, the Commerce Clause has probably
been the one most utilized. Over the years Congress has invoked and
perhaps stretched its stated power to regulate commerce among the
states to pass literally hundreds of laws, including significant civil rights
laws in the 1960's and 1970's, based on a theory that discrimination
affects interstate commerce. It has passed environmental laws, labor
laws, and criminal laws, and the Supreme Court has acquiesced and has
in fact given its stamp of approval to such enactments. It is this line of
decisions that is one of the primary targets of the Rehnquist Court.
In Printz v. United States,1 the Court held that Congress exceeded its
power in passing the Brady Handgun Act, which commanded the state's
Chief Law Enforcement Officers to search records to ascertain whether a
person could lawfully purchase a handgun. Despite its previously
broadly construed Commerce Clause source, the Court reasoned that the
history and structure of the Constitution prohibits Congress from
"This speech was given on October 5,1998 (the First Monday).
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; Valparaiso University (J.D., 1973);
Indiana University (B.A., 1969; M.A., 1970).
' 521 U.S. 98 (1997).
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conscripting state executive officers to enforce a federal regulatory
program. Earlier, in New York v. United States,2 the Court invalidated an
environmental law, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Act, that
required states to either enact measures to deal with the problem of low
radioactive waste generated within their borders by 1996 or else to take
title to the waste. The Court ruled that Congress may not "commandeer"
state officials to exercise legislative power to assist the federal
government. This was only the second time since 1936 that a federal law
was invalidated on Tenth Amendment grounds, as the other decision
had been overturned in 1985. 3
Finally, in United States v. Lopez, 4 the Court ruled that Congress
exceeded its Commerce Clause power in passing a federal criminal
statute, the Gun-Free School Zone Act, which prohibited the possession
of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school. Congress failed to demonstrate
that the regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce.
Further, the criminal statute had nothing to do with commerce, nor was
possession of firearms in any way connected with a commercial
transaction. The Court invoked federalism, stressing that the statute
governed areas historically left to states, namely criminal law
enforcement and education.5
The Rehnquist Court's concern for states' rights is also apparent in a
series of recent decisions that protect state agencies and state officials
from suit in federal court. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution
was enacted to restore state sovereignty by protecting states from suit in
a federal forum. However, the Supreme Court long ago recognized two
principles that restrict this immunity. First, the states, through their
representatives in Congress, may waive state immunity from suit.
Second, the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude a federal court from
enjoining a state official where there is an ongoing violation of federal
law, even though the state itself may be immune.6
In a landmark ruling, the Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida7
attacked both of these well-established limitations on the Eleventh
2 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
3 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) was expressly overruled in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,546-47 (1985).
4 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5 This was the first time since 1936 that a federal law not directly aimed at states was
declared unconstitutional simply because it exceeded the scope of Congress' Commerce
Clause authority.
6 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
7 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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Amendment. The Court held that Congress lacks the power to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment when it acts under the Commerce Clause, or
any Article I power; thus, the State of Florida could not be subjected to
suit in federal court. The Court further held that even suits seeking
injunctive relief against state officials, rather than the state itself, are
barred when Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for
enforcing a statutorily created right against a state. As to the first
holding, the Seminole case places in jeopardy numerous federal statutes
such as environmental laws, labor laws, and even some civil rights laws
that expressly authorize suit in federal court against state government,
but that were enacted under the Commerce Clause.8 As to the second
ruling, it represents the first time in almost 100 years that the Supreme
Court has disallowed suit against a state official in federal court. It
seriously threatens the well-established principle that state government
action that violates federal rights may be enjoined by naming the
responsible officials as defendants in the federal court action.
One year later, in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,9 the Court
again held that a federal court may not hear an action against state
officers for injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court reasoned that the
Indian tribe in essence sought adjudication of Idaho's title to land, and
that an injunction against the governor would deprive the state of all
practical benefits of ownership of the disputed waters and submerged
lands. This was too direct an affront to state sovereignty, even if the
state itself was not named as a defendant. Four Justices, dissenting in
both Seminole and Coeur d'Alene, argued that there was nothing unique in
either of these cases to abandon the "general principle of federal equity
jurisdiction that has been recognized throughout our history and for
centuries before our own history began."10
These recent decisions expand state immunity, and the price is loss
of state accountability for federal law violations. Our lectures this
afternoon will focus more specifically on the use of federalism to justify
the Court's refusal to recognize and protect individual rights from
a For example, the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have recently held that
the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state in federal court under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which was enacted under Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Mueller v. Thompson, 133 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 1998) (listing cases). The Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits have held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, although the First, Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have disagreed. See 67 U.S.L.W. 2160 (9-22-
98).
9 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
10 Setninole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 177 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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government tyranny. Although the Framers did express concern that a
national system not invade and swallow up state sovereignty, they also
envisioned a system whereby individual rights would enjoy double
protection-under state and federal constitutions and in state and
federal courts. James Madison wrote that federal courts were necessary
to ensure the protection of individual liberties, and Justice Marshall in
the 1803 Marbury v. Madison decision established the important principle
of constitutional judicial review. As the Supreme Court wrote in Cooper
v. Aaron:" "[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and
that principle ever since has been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system."
The Rehnquist Court has turned federalism on its head by
abdicating its role as guardian of the rights of the people. It has
narrowed federal court jurisdiction based on its express declaration that
state courts are equally trustworthy in deciding constitutional claims,
and that federal courts should thus take a "passive" role in enforcing
constitutional values. 12 Professor Burt Neuborne has explained that this
concept of parity may be a "pretext for funneling federal constitutional
decisionmaking into state courts precisely because they are less likely to
be receptive to vigorous enforcement of federal constitutional
doctrine."1 3 Professor Neuborne's cynicism may be well-founded. An
overview of recent decisions suggests that while abdicating its duty to
protect the rights of the politically powerless in our society, the Court
has in actuality not relinquished its role as final arbiter of the meaning of
the Constitution and indeed has taken an "activist" stance when this
would advance a political agenda that favors the interests of the
majority.
For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First
Amendment Free Speech Clause to prohibit state and local government
from enacting hate speech statutes. As Justice White wrote in RAV v.
City of St. Paul, Minnesota14 "the majority legitimates hate speech as a
form of public discourse." The Court has also invoked the free speech
11358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
12 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S.Ct. at 2037 ("neither in theory nor in
practice has it been shown problematic to have federal claims resolved in state courts ....
For purposes of the Supremacy Clause, it is simply irrelevant whether the claim is brought
in state or federal court.").
13 Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105-1106 (1977).
14 505 U.S. 377, 402 (1992).
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guarantee to expand the rights of big business by affording significant
protection for commercial speech, holding, for example, that big business
should be able to advertise its wares free from state interference.15
Another example is provided by the Court's decisions interpreting
the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has held that the due
process clause protects against abuses of government power, but only
where such instances are sufficiently egregious so as to "shock the
judicial conscience." Last summer the Court ruled that it does not shock
the judicial conscience for a police officer to conduct a high speed chase
of up to 100 miles per hour (mph) through a residential area to pursue a
juvenile on a motorcycle whose only crime was refusing another officer's
command to stop.16 The chase ended seventy-five seconds after it began
when the motorcycle overturned, and the deputy skidded into and killed
the sixteen-year old. Nonetheless, the Court ruled its conscience would
not be shocked unless the evidence showed the deputy acted "with intent
to harm"-a police officer does not violate substantive due process
merely by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to
life. On the other hand, this same Court has ruled that its judicial
conscience is shocked by juries that impose excessive punitive damage
awards on major companies like BMW, and it has invoked substantive
due process to overturn such awards. 17
Further, the Rehnquist Court has "actively" invoked the Equal
Protection Clause to invalidate state and municipal affirmative action
plans based on the disingenuous rationale that racism and sexism no
longer warrant any type of preferential treatment.18 My colleagues will
elaborate on these cases and provide other examples of this form of
judicial activism. My focus will be on the rights of religious minorities.
II. RESTRICTING RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE
NAME OF FEDERALISM
The Rehnquist Court's approach to the First Amendment religion
clauses clearly demonstrates both its willingness to protect majority
interests and its unjustified use of federalism to invalidate laws that
would protect the rights of those who lack political power. There are
15 44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (statute which bans
advertisement of retail liquor prices except at the place of sale violates the First
Amendment).
16 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998).
17 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
18 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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two clauses in the First Amendment-one prohibits government from
establishing religion and the other guarantees the free exercise of
religion. As to the Establishment Clause, the Court has clearly moved
from a strict wall of separation between church and state to an approach
which seeks to accommodate religion. At least three members of the
Court, namely, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
would permit virtually all forms of government assistance to religion
provided there is no coercion involved and the government is not
favoring any particular faith. Justice Kennedy would vote with these
accommodationists against a separatist approach, unless he perceives
some form of actual or subtle coercion. Justice O'Connor would provide
a fifth vote to sustain government involvement with religion provided
such appears neutral and arises out of a general scheme that only
incidentally benefits religion.
At first blush this may be seen as a movement towards greater
protection of religious liberty. Indeed, Justice Douglas, a jurist whose
philosophy was more "liberal" than that espoused by any currently
sitting Justice, wrote in 1952 that "When the state encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities ... it follows the best
of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.' 19
However, the wall of separation erected by the Warren Court is viewed
by members of religious minorities as a safeguard against practices
which tend to favor those majority religious faiths that have the political
power to enact laws for their own benefit. When government officials
decide to display religious symbols, to offer prayers at public functions,
or to institutionalize prayer in public schools, one can be assured that
neither Buddhism nor Islamic prayers or symbols will be selected. Yet
the Court has rejected Establishment Clause challenges and has upheld
public displays of religious symbols provided they are sanitized by a
secular context, such as a creche surrounded by reindeer and a Santa.20
Let me point out that I am not necessarily opposed to the Court's
movement towards a more accommodationist approach. Indeed I agree
with its most recent accommodationist decision, Agostini v. Felton.21 In
this decision, the Court overturned a 1985 Supreme Court ruling, Aguilar
v. Felton,22 which had denied Title I funds for remedial educational and
19 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).2
o County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
21 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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counseling services for needy children on parochial school grounds. The
Court in Aguilar assumed that having public salaried teachers set foot on
parochial school premises would end up impermissibly advancing
religion and causing excessive entanglement between church and state,
so the program violated the Establishment Clause. However, because
the Court did allow such services to be provided off parochial school
property, i.e., at neutral sites and in mobile instructional units parked
outside the parochial schools, Aguilar in essence meant that millions of
dollars had to be spent on leases and transportation rather than for
remedial education. At the time of the decision some 183,000 students
nationwide benefited from the program. The Court's ruling meant that
thirty-five percent fewer students would be served. The New York
School Board alone reported that as a result of the 1985 ruling it spent
$100 million to lease off-site instructional units and transport parochial
students to those sites.
It should be noted that the Title I program, enacted as part of the
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, specifically mandated
that parochial school classrooms used by public teachers to provide
remedial services were to be expunged of all religious paraphernalia. In
addition, only preapproved secular materials could be used, and
remedial instructors were cautioned not to inculcate religion into their
instruction. Thus, the only notable difference between on-campus and
off-campus instruction was the fact that the former took place on the
property of the parochial school, whereas the latter was administered in
mobile units that were often parked on the curb of the parochial school
campus! Although some have heralded Agostini as portending a
significant and welcome shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
perhaps foreshadowing a further crumbling of the wall of separation, I
applaud the decision on much more narrow grounds-namely, it means
that the special education needs of the impoverished of our society will
be better served, regardless of whether those children happen to attend
public or parochial school.
On one level, Agostini might be interpreted as a decision providing
greater protection for religious liberty, since it recognizes the right of
parents to select religious over public education. However, since the
vast majority of parochial schools are operated by mainstream religions,
i.e., over eighty percent are affiliated with the Catholic Church, the
Court's willingness to allow aid to parochial schools does not really
reflect a concern for minority religious interests. Indeed the Court's
willingness to accommodate religion under the Establishment Clause
stands in sharp contrast to its jurisprudence under the Free Exercise
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guarantee-a clause clearly intended to protect minority religious
interests from the will of the majority. Here the Court has really
subjected minority rights to a double whammo-both narrowly
construing the Free Exercise Clause and then vitiating Congress' attempt
to broaden religious rights by legislation. Ironically, many of the Justices
who have argued for an accommodationist approach under the
Establishment Clause have flatly rejected the need to accommodate the
religious practices of minority faiths under the Free Exercise Clause.23
In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,24 the Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause grants no special exemption from generally
applicable laws that appear neutral and that do not single out religious
groups for adverse treatment. No matter how much such laws burden
religious practices, they will be upheld provided they are rational. In
Smith, the Court rejected a claim by members of the Native American
Church that their free exercise right was unconstitutionally burdened by
an Oregon statute that criminalized the use of the drug peyote. Black
and Smith were terminated from their jobs and then denied
unemployment compensation by the state for engaging in their religious
practice of ingesting peyote sacramentally.
Prior to Smith, laws which substantially burdened religious freedom
were subject to a much stricter analysis: states had to show an
overriding interest that would be significantly impaired by granting a
religious exemption. In other words, states would have to accommodate
religion by granting an exemption unless this strict standard could be
met. Now, under Smith, a law will be sustained so long as it does not
single out religious behavior for punishment. Because Oregon's drug
law applied equally to all and it was rational, Smith and Black could lose
their claim to unemployment compensation and even be imprisoned,
despite the fact that ingesting peyote was central to their religious
beliefs. Native American Indians have been using peyote in their
ceremonies for centuries without causing societal problems.
Justice Scalia acknowledged in Smith that his rational basis test
would place religious minorities at the mercy of the political process, but
he blithely concluded that discriminatory treatment was an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government."25  The problem is that
23 An exception is Justice O'Connor who has maintained that, like the Establishment Clause,
the Free Exercise Clause requires, where possible, accommodation of religious practice.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
25 Id. at 890.
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democratic government generally will be sensitive to the religious needs
of the majority-i.e., during Prohibition an exemption was made for the
use of wine during Holy Communion-but it is apt, as was the case in
Oregon, to ignore the concerns of religious minorities. Since the whole
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects, such as
religious liberty, from the will of the majority-to establish certain
fundamental values that the courts are to protect-Justice Scalia's
comments are deeply troublesome. Indeed, Smith triggered an
immediate reaction nationwide and a massive coalition of mainstream
and minority religious leaders turned to Congress for help, and Congress
listened.
To restore greater protection for religious liberty, Congress, by an
overwhelming majority, 26 enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA). This law prohibits government from substantially
burdening a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
the burden furthers a compelling interest and is the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest.27 The victory for religious liberty was
unfortunately short-lived. The Supreme Court in City of Boerne v.
Flores,28 ruled that RFRA was an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power, even though its source was the Fourteenth
Amendment, which guarantees against state deprivation of our liberty.
The Court in Flores acknowledged that section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress the power "to enforce by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this Article," including the free exercise
guarantee. It concluded nonetheless that this enactment "alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause" and "cannot be said to be enforcing
the Clause."29  The Court drew a distinction between Congress'
legitimate power to enforce constitutional rights, i.e., to act in a remedial
fashion, and the illegitimate use of power to determine what constitutes
a constitutional violation. It determined that RFRA was not a proper
exercise of Congress' remedial or preventive power, despite 800 pages in
the Congressional Record setting forth the difficulty that minority
religions have had in getting exemption from facially neutral laws.3° The
216 The House voted unanimously and all but three senators endorsed this Act. 139 CONG.
REC. S. 14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27,1993).
27 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000b, et seq., (1993).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
29 Flores, 117 S.Ct. at 2164.
30 Such examples were cited both by the majority, see id. at 2169, and by the dissent, see id. at
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Court stated that RFRA was so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventive objective that it could not be understood as merely
responsive to any unconstitutional behavior. RFRA required state and
local legislation that substantially burdens religious liberty to meet a
compelling interest/least restrictive means test. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, determined that this violated federalism
principles because Congress intruded "into the States' traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare
of their citizens. 31
The Court's conclusion that RFRA was an unwarranted expansion of
Congress' power because it attempted to make a substantive change in
constitutional protections and thus intruded on the Court's bailiwick
appears misdirected. Congress was not declaring that an individual has
a constitutional right of free exercise greater than that announced in
Smith, but was merely adding a federal legislative right, one that on its face
is not inconsistent with or prohibited by Smith. RFRA addressed the
concern that the rights of religious minorities cannot be protected in.the
majoritarian legislatures and that even where laws are facially neutral,
by reason of indifference, if not hostility, religious minorities may find
themselves at a disadvantage.
At the beginning of my remarks I addressed the Court's recent
decisions restricting Congress' power under the Commerce Clause on
the theory that such laws intruded on state sovereignty. The Printz case,
invalidating aspects of the Brady Act, was indeed handed down two
days after Flores. The difference, however, is that RFRA was passed not
under the Commerce Clause, but under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled in the 1960's that section 5 is "a
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."32 Indeed, Chief
Justice Rehnquist himself wrote in a 1976 decision that the principle of
state sovereignty is
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . When
Congress acts pursuant to section 5, not only is it
exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the
2177.
31 Id. at 2171.
3 Cutsinbuck v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
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terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising tha
authority under one section of a constitutional
Amendment whose other sections by their own terms
embody limitations on state authority. 33
Justice Rehnquist cited the Fourteenth Amendment and observed that it
"quite clearly contemplates limitations on [state] authority' 34 and
represents a "shift in the federal-state balance."35
On several occasions in the past, the Supreme Court has given a
fairly narrow construction to a constitutional right, and Congress has
then passed a law under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
creating a more expansive federal statutory right. For example, the
Supreme Court ruled that Congress acted well within its authority under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in concluding that the needs of
the Puerto Rican minority warranted federal intrusion upon any state
interests served by English literacy requirements because such
requirements impaired the ability of this group to vote. Even though the
Supreme Court had earlier sustained the use of literacy tests by states
against a constitutional challenge, Congress was free to reevaluate the
situation and determine that in certain contexts a federal statutory right
to be free of restrictive literacy tests was warranted. 36
Similarly, after an all-male Supreme Court held that discrimination
based on pregnancy was not necessarily sex discrimination, Congress
passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment, which defines
discrimination based on pregnancy as a form of gender discrimination.
Congress created a federal statutory right on behalf of women employees
to be free from discrimination based on pregnancy even where that
discrimination would not be deemed to violate the equal protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 More analogous are the
congressional enactments of the 1960's, such as Title VII and the Voting
Rights Act, which dispense with proof of overt discrimination and allow
a remedy for conduct that has a discriminatory impact even though the
Equal Protection Clause itself has been interpreted by the Court as
33 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
34 Id. at 453.
35 Id. at 455.
36 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966).
37 The Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) reasoned that pregnancy
discrimination is not necessarily gender discrimination and Congress promptly responded
with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (1994) (redefining sex
discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination).
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reaching only intentionally discriminatory conduct. 38 In short, it is well
established that Congress, as well as state government, may confer more
rights than the Court finds in the Constitution.
In finding that RFRA cannot be viewed as necessary remedial
legislation, the Court has subjected this act of Congress to an even more
stringent test than that imposed with regard to laws passed under the
Commerce Clause. This again turns federalism on its head. The
Fourteenth Amendment was specifically aimed at states and designed to
limit their power following the Civil War. Historically, it makes no sense
to interpret section 5 as imposing more rigorous federalism constraints
on Congress than those imposed by the Commerce Clause. The latter
arguably was limited by the subsequently enacted Tenth Amendment
that carved out a sphere of power reserved exclusively to the states, and
the Eleventh Amendment that was adopted to protect states from federal
court judges.
Flores is troublesome not only because it leaves religious liberty
without effective federal protection, but also because it casts doubt on
Congress' power to address other pressing national problems under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's new
proportionality requirement-that congressional enactments be
reasonably well-suited to their end-is vague. As Douglas Laycock, the
attorney who argued and lost the RFRA battle before the Supreme Court,
opined, "Flores significantly limits Congress' independent power to
protect the civil liberties of the American people. How significantly
remains to be seen, because the opinion announced a vague standard of
uncertain scope."39
It is difficult to understand how federalism mandates this result.
The purpose of federalism is to ensure against federal tyranny by
dividing power between state and federal governments. However, if
Congress is expanding rights, there is no reason to fear tyranny. Further,
federalism is promoted because it purportedly infuses power into state
and local government which is closer to the people and thus more likely
38 The Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) held that only overt
discrimination in employment is prohibited by the Equal Protection guarantee, but Title VII
requires employers to justify practices that have a disparate impact on protected groups by
showing job-relatedness or business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Further, the
Voting Rights Act imposes a "results" test despite the Supreme Court's holding in City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) that ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment itself forbade
only purposeful vote dilution.
39 Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
743, 745 (1998).
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to be responsive to their needs and concerns. The whole point of RFRA,
however, is to acknowledge that the majoritarian processes, whether at a
state, local, or federal level, often ignore the needs of minority faiths.
The Court's reliance on federalism in this context thus appears suspect.
The most obvious effect of Flores is to reduce protection of free
exercise of religion by returning the law to the test articulated in Smith,
i.e., that a neutral law of general applicability will never be found to
violate the Free Exercise Clause provided government can muster any
rational basis for its enactment. Flores means that people in the United
States, primarily those who lack political power, will have far less
protection for their religious practices. It certainly means that many
claims of free exercise of religion that previously would have prevailed
under RFRA now certainly will lose. Thus, in less than a decade the
Rehnquist Court has restricted one of the most revered principles in the
Bill of Rights by invoking judicial passivism to deny any meaningful
protection to religious liberty under the Constitution and then by
offering a novel, unprincipled and certainly "judicially active"
interpretation of federalism to vitiate Congress' attempt to correct the
Court's error.
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